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In an earlier essay I have dealt with the intellect-will problem
in the thought of Nicholas of Cuss.' In the present article I will
treat the same question in the thought of three other NorthernRenaissance humanists: Colet, Erasmus, and Montaigne. Finally
in my "Summary and Conclusion" at the end of this essay, I shall
endeavor to draw some comparisons and contrasts covering all
four of the men.

1. John Colet
Colet's View of Man's Nature
John Colet (d. 1519), perhaps most famous as an English
educator in Oxford and London, adhered to the Augustinian
doctrine of original sin, involving inherited guilt and universal
human d e p r a ~ i t y When
.~
Adam sinned the whole race sinned so
that his descendants were born with depraved natures and perverted intellects and wills, subject to the sentence of eternal death.
Leland Miles suggests that Colet argued for a tendency to evil
in fallen man with no "absolute obliteration of free will."3 Ernest
Hunt quotes Colet to prove that his concept involved total
depravity of reason and will in relation to spiritual matters:
lSee AUSS 12 (July 1974): 83-93. The introductory section in that earlier
essay (pp. 83-84) outlines more specifically the particular problem treated in
both articles, and it may therefore be useful to reread that section as an
introduction to the material being presented now.
aLeland Miles, John Colet and the Platonic Tradition (La Salle, Ill., 1961),
pp. 88-89.
Ibid.
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His fall is total: after the Fall "man had no whole and undefiled
nature, no unclouded reason, no upright will. Whatever men did
among themselves, was foolish and wicked." The whole of
humanity has been corrupted by the Fall; the sequel of Adam's
primal sin was "one long course of downfall, stumbling, error,
and deception amongst men"; man was unable to "establish anything sure, anything holy, anything wholesome, anything to please
God or benefit mankind"; the life, laws, customs, and deeds of
mankind were polluted and foul.*

In An Exposition of St. P a d s Epistle to the Romans, Colet
describes man as comprising "a sentient body'' and a soul or
"inner man."5 Because of man's fallen condition the body, with its
passions and desires, is in complete control of the soul. "From its
violence and tyranny the soul, that is, the poor inner man, being
weak and powerless by reason of Adam's unhappy fall, has been
incapable, with all its efforts, of releasing and liberating it~elf.''~
The soul consists of two parts: intelligence or heat, and will or
light.' The "most excellent" part of the soul is the intellect.*
In the absence of divine aid the will is unable to assume
dominance over the clamorings of the body, and the intellect is
unable to grasp any worthwhile knowledge of God.
Colet's teaching of the bondage of the will before justification
is based on the doctrine of single predestination (by contrast
with double predestination). The sins of men are foreknown by
God, but not predetermined by him. In respect to the damned,
God's foreknowledge is distinct from his predetermination, so that
he is in no way responsible for eviLg Colet did not assert, as
Luther did, that all things, whether good or evil, happen of
necessity.1° Rather, he urged that "God's foreknowledge and
Ernest William Hunt, Dean Colet and His Theology (London, 1956), p. 11.
John Colet, An Exposition of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, trans.
J . H. Lupton (Farnborough, Hants., Eng., 1873, 1965), p. 16. Hereinafter
referred to as Colet, Romans.
Ibid., p. 17.
Ibid., p. 72.
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 5.
Martin Luther, T h e Bondage of the Will, trans. J . I . Packer and 0. R.
Johnston (London, 1957), pp. 80-81.

36

ERWIN R. GANE

truth" are not "the cause of sin being committed; nor is a sin,
though foreknown, in any degree the cause of God's foreknowledge appearing true."ll Unregenerate men have no power
to choose goodness, much less to perform it; but they are,
nonetheless, totally responsible for their depravity and ultimate
ruin.
In the case of the elect, on the other hand, Colet equates God's
foreknowledge with his foreordination.12 The decision to deliver
them from bondage to the sentient body, so that the soul (intellect and will) might henceforth rule and dictate behavior
consistent with its will, was an arbitrary one made by God before
Creation. Those alone can come to God whom he calls, and these
are the ones "whom he has foreordained, purposed, promised,
elected and predestinated."13 "For what he has determined and
promised in the future, depends not on the will of men, but on
his own power and choice."14 Those whom God has thus chosen
cannot resist his grace.18 Colet defines grace as "divine mercy,"
the love which is infused into man by the Holy Spirit so that men
will love him in return.16 Colet7s position is simply that apart
from grace man has no free will either in the sense of power to
choose holiness or in the sense of capacity to implement choice.
A few years later Luther was to enunciate the same doctrine.
The man whose will is thus bound was described by Colet in
Neo-Platonic terms as the victim of "multiplicity." He is enslaved
by the multiple urges of his fleshly self. Justification was defined
by Colet as reconciliation with God which renders possible a consolidation in "unity."17 The three steps in restoration to unity are
hope, faith, and love (in that order). Hope engenders purification, unity, existence, and power; faith results in light, intellect,
=Colet, Romans, p. 5.
Ibid., pp. 27, 32, 34, 37-38.
"I bbid., p. 37.
l4 Ibid., p. 38.
l5 Ibid., p. 10; Miles, p. 92.
l6 Miles, p. 92.
l7 Hunt, pp. 110-111.
l2
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and knowledge; and love motivates heart, will, and goodness.18
The establishment of these three qualities in the soul results in
man's restoration to his genuinely authentic selfhood.
We may conclude therefore, that by hope we have existence;
by faith, knowledge; and by love, goodness; and that in thqse
three consist the life and growth of the soul, whereby it lives,
and has being, knowledge, and love of God; whereby it stands,
and preserves and sustains itself; whereby also it reigns-in the
body and binds it in obedience to itself; whereby, in a word,
the whole man is good, beautiful, and happy.ls

Miles traces the epistemological tradition by which purification (hope ) was a prelude to knowledge (faith). Plato, Paul,
~ugustine, and Dionysius substantially agree that the first
infused grace produces purifi~ation.~~
To Colet, the knowledge
which results from faith is beyond natural reason. It is a mystical
knowledge, "a kind of light infused into the soul of man from the
divine sun, by which the heavenly verities are known to be
revealed without uncertainty or doubt; and it as far excels the
light of reason, as certainty does ~ n c e r t a i n t y . "l~ i~ s mystic
knowledge, resulting from union with the divine, is the
only true wisdom, as far as Colet is concerned. It can be
'"received and delivered by those who were utterly devoid of
the dark wisdom that consists in human reason."22 It is wisdom
"only from God in C h r i ~ t . " ~ ~

Colet and Philosophy
,

Despite Colet's insistence that authentic knowledge and wisdom
are available only to the believer who has entered into a mystic
union with God's Son, he recognizes that the other two sources
Is Colet, Romans, p. 62; cf. Sears Jayne, John Colet and Marsilio Ficiuo
(London, 1963), p. 65.
l8Colet, Romans, p. 62.
Miles, pp. 124-126.
=Ibid., p. 130.
John Colet, An Exposition of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians,
trans. J . H. Lupton (Farnborough, Hants., IEng., 1874, 1965), p. 19. Hereinafter
referred to as Colet, Corinthians.
lbid., p. 11.
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of knowledge identified by Neo-Platonism are valid, even if to
a much lesser degree. "Men are taught by God in three ways . . .
by his sensible creation, by his spiritual and angelic creation;
and by His Son.'"* Even though he rejected the natural theology
of the scholastics, Colet was prepared to concede that the visible
universe is a source of very limited understanding of ultimate
truth and wisdom.25According to Miles, Colet's authorities for this
were Paul ( Rom 1:20) and Plato ( Laws 12:967, 968).
It is true that Colet regarded the Bible as the one ultimate
In this he was in accord with the 16th-century
standard of
Reformers. Eugene F. Rice argues that Colet entirely repudiated
philosophy as a source of
Rice refers to the three positions
.~~
on the question of faith and reason outlined by W ~ l f s o n First
is the double-faith theory in which true faith is acceptance of
Scripture with or without the assistance of philosophy. Second
is the single-faith theory by which a rational approach to
Scripture utilizes the aid of philosophy. Third is the authoritarian
single-faith theory which requires acceptance of Scripture without
any help from philosophy. Rice is convinced that Colet adhered
to the single-faiththeory of the authoritarian variety, Hunt agrees:
The Bible held the whole truth. That was Colet's conviction.
"In the choice and well-stored table of Holy Scripture all things
are contained that belong to the truth." So convinced was he
of the all-sufficiency of the Bible that he discouraged the use of
pagan authors as an aid to the understanding of it. "Now if any
should say, as is often said, that reading pagan authors helps us to
understand the Holy Scriptures, let them consider whether the
fact of placing such reliance on them does not make them
an obstacle to such understanding. In so doing you distrust your
ability to understand the Scriptures by grace alone and prayer,
and by the aid of Christ and of faith." And so he urges that "those
Miles, p. 122
122-123, 143.
%Hunt, p. 62.
nEugene F. Rice, "John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural,"
HTR 45 (July 1952): 152.

" Ibid., pp.

28

Ibid.

COLET, ERASMUS, A N D MONTAIGNE

books alone ought to be read in which there is a salutary flavour
of Christ; in which Christ is set forth for us to feed upon."28

Miles, Cassirer, and Jayne disagree with Rice, Hunt, and Hyma
on this question of Colet's willingness (or unwillingness) to use
philosophy as a handmaiden to theology. Miles and Cassirer
refer to Colet's opinion that one who bears the true spirit of
Christ is far more a Christian than one who has never heard of
him.30 Miles cites Colet's statement in his exposition of Romans :
"The Gentiles had for their guidance philosophers who were
taught by observation of nature; the Jews had prophets who were
taught by the angels; and lastly we Christians have Apostles,
who were fully taught by Jesus."31 Miles is convinced that Colet
recognized various means used by God throughout history to
reveal truth. Colet rejected Ficino's and Cusa's universalism,
staunchly maintaining that God's media of revelation are distinctly
superior. Only Christians can receive the "full truth." But "Colet
intermittently takes the position to which Augustine finally came,
namely, that Greek (and Jewish) philosophy, while inferior, contain some degree of truth, and can be accepted and used wherever
they are verified by, or at least do not conflict with, Christian
authority."32 Hence Miles sees Colet as standing somewhere
between Tertullian's unequivocal rejection of philosophy and
the radical humanism of the Florentine Neo-Platoni~ts.~~
This
is tantamount to placing Colet, on this question, squarely within
the Clementine-Augustinian tradition.
Jayne bolsters Miles' argument.34 His study of Colet's annotations in the margins of Ficino's Ephtolae has emphasized that
Colet was interested in Platonism mainly in the years at Oxford.
He found it a fruitful source of material for his theological lectures
Hunt, p. 102.
Miles, p. 23; Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance
Philosophy (New York, 1963), p. 77; Colet, Romans, pp. 87-88.
Ibid., citing Colet, Romans.
32 Ibid., p. 24.
33 Ibid., p, 30.
34 Jayne, pp. 77-78.
29

30
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on the Bible. Although he rejected Ficino's speculative, intellectual approach, he incorporated many Platonic and Neo-Platonic
features into his lectures. Insofar as Platonism seemed consistent
with Paul, Colet used it even though in certain key issues there
was, in fact, a significant contradiction between the two sources.
Jayne pertinently remarks, "Colet would obviously not have revived a school if he had not believed that moral training involves
intellectual discipline."35
Was Colet a Humanist?
Rice takes great pains to convince us that John Colet was not a
humanist.36 He presents two main arguments. First Colet held
the traditional medieval Augustinian concept of wisdom as divine
knowledge, rather than the classical view of wisdom as natural
human perfection, an active commitment of virtue. It was towards
this latter definition that Renaissance humanism tended. Second,
Colet accepted only revelation as the means of achieving wisdom, whereas the Renaissance humanists exalted reason as its primary source. In regard to the first point, it is interesting to consider
the classical definitions of wisdom which Rice gives in his book
The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom. Plato, for example, said that
wisdom was a contemplation of eternal, immutable, and intelligible Ideas; and Aristotle defined wisdom as a knowledge of the
first causes and principles of things and called it a "divine
science."37 Rice prefers to accept as the classical definition of
wisdom that held by Cicero and Seneca: a moral vktue which is
an imitation of reason and nature. This concept Charron accepted,
and hence he was a true Renaissance humanist. It seems not
inappropriate to point out that if we were to accept the definition
of wisdom given by the two most influential classical philosophers,
Colet would have to be regarded as considerably more a humanist
than Charron.
=Ibid., p. 78.
86Rice,"John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural," p. 142; cf. Eugene
F. Rice, The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 19-29.
a7 Rice, Renaissance Idea of Wisdom, p. 1.
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Sears Jayne rejects Rice's contention that Colet's concept of
wisdom was essentially contemplative and, therefore, subversive
of the Renaissance human, ethical, and moral bias.38 Colet, he
says, was a voluntarist. His concern was moral action and ethical
reform. Whereas Ficino emphasized the intellectual faculty of
the soul, Colet emphasized its moral faculty.39 It was the good
works which the regenerated man could do through the power of
the Holy Spirit that Colet consistently extolled.40 If Rice should
object that Renaissance humanism exalted the efficiency of man's
free will in the ethical enterprise, by contrast with Colet's annihilation of free will, the answer could be given that Colet
~~
considered the regenerated will as decidedly e f f e ~ t i v e .The
doctrine of faith formed by love, to which Colet gave credence,
allowed for a certain distinct autonomy of will after justification.
Rice's second suggestion, that true Renaissance humanism employed human reason as the primary means of attaining wisdom,
in contrast to Colet's reliance upon revelation, would appear to
be a serious e ~ a g g e r a t i o nIt
. ~is~ not entirely true, for example, as
Rice says, that "for Erasmus the insights of wisdom are natural
products of the human reason."43 As we shall see in the next
section, Erasmus too had considerable respect for revelation as
a source of wisdom. As indicated above, Colet did give some
credence to the insights of philosophy. If a humanist must be one
who accepts only the presumed classical means of achieving
wisdom, i.e., natural reason, there can be no such thing as
Christian humanism. We would be in the invidious position of
having to exclude such great Christian scholars as Erasmus
and Melanchthon from the humanist camp.
Perhaps it is more correct to define a humanist as one who
Jayne, pp. 70-73.
Ibid., p. 73.
40 Colet, Corinthians, pp. 32, 129, 139-140, 142-143.
41 Rice, "John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural," p. 148.
Ibid., pp. 145, 147.
Ibid., p. 146.
39
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acknowledged some place for human intellect and reason in the
study of human behavior and its causes, and sometimes in the
critical study of Christian sources (Scripture, the Fathers,
philosophy), but not in the dialectical investigation of first causes
and the nature of absolute truth. If this is correct, both the secularists and the revelationists can be included. Colet does not completely divest human intellect of insight into matters human.
Nor does he regard philosophy as completely devoid of truth consistent with the Christian message. He does not, however, go so far
as Luther, who regarded philosophy as decidedly harmful and
advised against its use." Hence we may justifiably regard Colet
as a humanist.
2. Eramnus of Rotterdam
In his article ''John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural,"
Rice describes the gap between Colet's theology and Erasmus' humanism as similar to that between Erasmus and
Luther.45 He says that the medieval Augustinian tradition, of
which Colet was a part, differs from humanism in that it continued to define sapientia in terms of Christian revelation. "It is
precisely this disassociation of wisdom and revelation which is
the novel element in the humanist conception of ~apientia."~~
Hence the humanist definition of wisdom is closer to the Ciceronian. Rice presents Erasmus and Conrad Celtis as typical representatives of the trend. They wished to invest wisdom with much
of its old ethical and scientific meaning. For Celtis sapientia
involves "a love of astronomical and physical in~estigation."~~
Rice fails to indicate the distinction between Celtis and Erasmus
on the question of science. Speaking of Erasmus, Preserved Smith
explains:
Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther (Philadelphia, 1963, 1966),
pp. 4, 9-11; cf. William M. Landeen, Martin Luther's Religious Thought
(Mountain View, California, 1971), p. 89.
&Rice, "John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural," pp. 141-163.
46 Ibid., p. 145.
47 Ibid.
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Then, again, he had no interest in science. While Leonardo
was experimenting in anatomy and physics and accumulating
facts about geology and astronomy, while Copernicus was working
out the most momentous discovery that has ever dawned upon
the human mind, while Vives, who was well known to Erasmus,
was stating that men should no longer rely on authority but
should look at nature for themselves, the attitude of Erasmus
was intensely conservative. Like Socrates, he not only did not
care for natural science, he actively disliked it as leading men's
thoughts away from the more important problems of moral
philosophy.&

Rice indicates that Erasmus shared Celtis' ethical concept of
wisdom. This is the emphasis, he says, in the Enchiridion Militis
C h r i ~ t i a n iEven
. ~ ~ though Rice recognizes that Erasmus found in
Christ the ultimate source of wisdom, it was wisdom resulting
from an imitation of his virtues rather than from acceptance of
revelation. "For Erasmus the insights of wisdom are natural
products of the human reason."50 Erasmus promised immortality
to the follower of Ciceronian ethics.51 He emphasized antique
virtue as sufficient for salvation. "The rigid identification of
sapientia with revelation gradually gives way to a @sea sapientia
whose primary source is the natural reason of the classical
moralists. Colet classified wisdom under faith and illumination;
Erasmus and Celtis under reason and h ~ m a n i t a s . " ~ ~
In order to test the validity of Rice's assertions we need to investigate further the questions he discusses. First, what was
Erasmus' concept of wisdom? Was it wholly human and ethical
or was there a revelational element? Second, what were the means
emphasized by Erasmus, with which man might achieve wisdom?
Did all depend on human intellect and will or was there a
distinctly divine ingredient?
48Preserved Smith, Erasmus: A Study of His Life, Ideals, and Phce in
History (New York, 1923, 1962), p. 35.
4BRice,"John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural." p. 145.
60 Ibid., p. 146.
Ibid.
6a Ibid., p. 147.
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Eramnus' Concept of Wisdom; the "Philosophia Christi"
According to Lewis W. Spitz, even though Erasmus' Praise of
Folly at times sounds like Ovid and Cicero, who saw in nature
and reason the source of good ethical conduct, the more predominant motif is, in fact, the true sapientiu "which comes from
above and which can best be learned from the Wisdom incarnate.
Erasmus does not stand on naturalistic ground, antique or
modern."53 Similar ambivalence is evident in Erasmus' colloquy,
"The Epicurean." The best things in life are enjoyed to the
full by the religious man. Indeed, Christ was the greatest
philosopher and the leading Epicurean. Nevertheless, Christian
piety is linked with the transcendent God, and union with him,
rendering possible release from the limitations of nature, is man's
highest good.54
There is an undoubted ethical emphasis in the Emhiridion.
The virtue of the Stoics and the probity of the Christians are
spoken of as wisdom.55 But the ultimate revelational nature of
wisdom is very much in evidence.
On the other hand, the author of wisdom-rather, Wisdom
itself-is Christ Jesus, who is the true light, the only light dispelling the light of worldly folly; the radiance of His Father's glory
who, according to Paul, was made our wisdom when He became
the redemption and justification for us who have been reborn in
Him . . . and following His example, we can overcome our
enemy, wickedness, if only we are wise in Him, in whom we
shall conquer. . . . For, as Paul says, in the eyes of God there
is no more profound folly than worldly wisdom: it must be
unlearned by one who wishes to be truly wise.%

Erasmus worked for the rebirth of letters ( renascentes litterae),
and a restitution of Christianity ( restitutw Christianismi ) .57
Lewis W. Spitz, T h e Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists
(Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 207-208.
" Ibid., pp. 209-210.
66Raymond Himelick, trans., T h e Enchiridion of Erasmus (Bloomington,
Ind., 1963), p. 59.
Ibid., pp. 59-60.
" Spitz, pp. 203-204.
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Christianity could be restored only by attention to its earliest
literary sources. In the preface to his Greek New Testament he
urged renewed attention to the commandments of the Founder
of the Faith, to evangelical and apostolic sources.58The reform
which he had in mind involved a critical use of the Scriptures,
. ~ ~ term he gave to the
Church Fathers, and bonae l i t t e t ~ e The
resultant world-view was "philosophia Christi." Both Agricola and
Abelard had used the term before him. It described an eclectic
Christian philosophy of the kind advocated by Justin Martyr who
in the 2d century A.D. wrote his two apologies and the Dialogue
with Tryphoa60Erasmus thought it much worse for a Christian
to be ignorant of Christ's teaching than for Aristotelians to be
ill-informed as to the true teachings of Aristotle. The Stoics,
Epicureans, Socrates, and Aristotle taught truths which were
later reiterated by Christ; but he taught them best, and perfectly
practised what he preached. J. Huizinga concludes that Erasmus'
classicism "only serves him as a form, and from antiquity he only
chooses those elements which in ethical tendency are in conformity with his Christian ideal."G1
The Means of Achieving Wisdom
It is not true, in Smith's estimation, that there was no mystical
ingredient in the piety of Erasmus, that it was all ethical.62The
influence of the Brethren of the Common Life stayed with him and
imparted a recognition of the role of the spirit. From the
Florentine Platonic Academy Erasmus derived much of his
lespect for Greek philosophy and for the right of reason.63His
religion became a life (as distinct from a creed) in which
Ibid.
Ibid.
BO Ibid.
61 Johann Huizinga, Erasmus and the Age o f Reformation (New York, 1924,

68

59

1957).

82Smith, pp. 52-53.
a Ibid.
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revelation and reason were linked in somewhat tenuous coexistence.64
Although Erasmus sometimes divided man into the threefold
division of body, soul, and spirit, usually he spoke of only the two
components, body and spirit.65The two main powers of the spirit
were understanding and will. He related faith to understanding
and love to will. Faith was a "cognitive principle for spiritual
tr~ths."~6
Understanding and knowledge are essential to faith.
Faith is not primarily an existential experience for Erasmus.
This is why in the Enchridion he offers knowledge as one of the
two vital weapons for the Christian. The other is prayer.67 The
three sources of knowledge which he stressed are Scripture, the
early-church Fathers, and the philosophers.
For Erasmus, the Scriptures were paramount as the source of
truth.68 His exegetical method called for the use of intellect and
reason. It was the historical-grammatical method, which employs
both literary and textual criticism. His work on the Greek text of
the New Testament and the Greek and Latin Fathers earned him
the reputation of being a founder of modern textual criticism. But
he favored the allegorical method of interpretation by which hidden meanings are looked for beneath the superficial and the
literal.69
In respect to philosophy, Erasmus rejected Scholasticism out of
hand. In his Ratio verae theologkze, he contrasts the theology of
the scholastics with that of Origen, Basil, and Jerorne.'O The
older theology he likens to a golden river, the scholastic to a small
rivulet which has been polluted. On the other hand, pagan
authors should be studied. The philosophy of the Greeks coma Ibid.

%RolandH. Bainton, Erasmzs of Christendom (New York, 1969), pp. 60-61.
Spitz, pp. 231-232.
07 Himelick, pp. 47-48.
John C. Olin, ed., Luther, Erasmus and the Reformation: a CatholicProtestant Reappraisal (New York, 1969), p. 102.
69 Himelick, p. 53.
70 Ibid., p. 213. (See Erasmus, Opera Omnia, 592.)
ffi
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prised a kind of natural gospel.71 The classics were Erasmus'
source for his conception of humanitas as virtue, morality, and
integrity in the Roman sense.72In fact, he was prepared to credit
some of the classical writers with a measure of inspiration. In
the colloquy, "The Godly Feast," Erasmus puts these words into
the mouth of Eusebius:
On the contrary, whatever is devout and contributes to good
morals should not be called profane. Of course, Sacred Scripture
is the basic authority in everything; yet I sometimes run across
ancient sayings or pagan writings-even the poets'-so purely
and reverently expressed, and so inspired, that I can't help
believing their authors' hearts were moved by some divine power.
And perhaps the spirit of Christ is more widespread than we
understand, and the company of saints includes many not in our
calendar. Speaking frankly among friends, I can't read Cicero's
De senectute, De amicitia, De oficiis, De Tuscdanis quaestionibus
without sometimes kissing the book and blessing that pure heart,
divinely inspired as it was.73

The real point seems to be, not that Erasmus attempted to
separate faith and reason, as Rice would have us believe, but
that he sought to draw reason into the realm of faith, in the sense
that he used philosophy, not as a handmaiden of theology, but as
a rational contributor to that instructed faith which he saw as
vital to the good life.
Erasmus' Concept of the Will
In his Discourse on Free Will ( 1524), Erasmus defended two
main theses: (1) that the doctrine of absolute necessity in all
happenings is false, and ( 2 ) that the free will of man can a c
complish something. Grace is essential, but man's will is free to
choose the good and to co-operate with grace. In relation to the
first point, Erasmus rejected the teachings of Colet and Luther
on the question of predestination. Colet, as we have seen,
identified or "coalesced" God's foreknowledge and predestination
71

Smith, p. 34.
Spitz, p. 21 1.
Erasmus, Ten Colloquies, trans. Craig R. Thompson (New York, 1957),

p. 155.
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in the case of the saved. Both Colet and Luther, with some shade
of difference, looked upon the will of the justified man as
not being the cause of his justification; rather, God's arbitrary
predetermination was the cause. Erasmus saw God's foreknowledge as compatible with human freedom of choice. "Foreknowledge," he said, "does not cause what is to take place. Even
we know many things which will be happening. They will not
happen because we know them, but vice versa."74Bainton brands
this argument as specious:
There can be sure foreknowledge only of that which is
definitely fixed. A man can, of course, foresee that which he has not
foreordained, but if there is only one God, there is no other on
whom to lay the responsibility for the predetermination. A single
omnipotent and omniscient God can foreknow only what He has
foreordained. Luther insisted on this squarely. And he was
convinced that he understood the mind of

Perhaps Erasmus was more Pauline than Bainton suggests. In
Rom 8:29, 30 predestination of those "to be conformed to the
image of his Son" comes after foreknowledge, and the call comes
after the predestination. In Rom 9, the crucial chapter over
which Luther and Erasmus argued so bitterly, God is not
spoken of as predetermining the faith of the spiritual seed of
Abraham, but rather the fulfillment of the promise to those
foreknown to have faith. It would seem highly possible that an
omnipotent and omniscient God could foreordain that his human
creatures should have freedom of choice. Of course, if they chose
evil, God could be blamed for granting them such freedom. But
since he exercised his omnipotence to the extent of refraining
from coercion in either direction, man is responsible for the
results of his own choice.
This was precisely Erasmus7 point. After the Fall and before
the gift of special grace, human reason, intellect, and will were
74Er11st F. Winter, trans. & ed., Erasmus-Luther Discourse on Free Will
(New York, 1961), p. 49.
75 Bainton, p. 190.
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weak but not entirely extinct.76 By free will before grace,
Erasmus meant freedom to choose either good or eviLT7Whether
he credited man's will with the capacity to implement the choice
before grace is a moot point. He claimed that "they had a will
tending to moral good, but incapable of eternal salvation, unless
grace be added through faith."'8 Again and again he asserted
man's incapacity to perform good works apart from grace.7g
This rather tends to weaken respect for his favorite classical
authors who were not Christians. Hence he adds:
The fact remains that there have been philosophers who
possessed some knowledge of God, and hence perhaps also some
trust and love of God, and did not act solely out of vainglory's
sake, but rather out of love of virtue and goodness, which,
they taught, was to be loved for no other reason but that it is
good.80

Erasmus told Thomas More that if it were not for Paul's
authority to the contrary, he would have been inclined to believe
that man by his natural powers could earn the lesser merit
( meriturn de congruo ) .
After the reception of grace, Erasmus thought, reason is
restored and will is strengthened to c ~ o p e r a t e ."Thus
~~
faith
heals our reason which has suffered through sin, and charity
helps our weakened will to act."82 By means of this "operative"
grace man is capable of performing ethically good works which
render him an eligible applicant for "ultimate" grace by which
sin is finally and irrevocably e r a d i ~ a t e d .The
~ ~ recipients of
"operative" grace are, therefore, able to "trust in their own
works."84Here is the semi-Pelagian element in Erasmus' theology.
%Winter, p. 22.
Ibid., pp. 22-23, 25-26, 29-80.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., pp. 22-24.
Ibid., p. 28.
Bainton, pp. 188-189.
s2 Winter, p. 24.
s3 Ibid., p. 29.
saIbid., p. 45.
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After reception of "operative" grace, man has now both the
freedom of choice and a certain capacity to earn merit by the
implementation of the choice. Colet substantially agreed. Luther
vehemently disagreed, recognizing neither free choice nor an
independent power of cooperation with grace. Significantly,
Melanchthon rejected predestination and took a position somewhere between Erasmus and Luther on the question of the
He agreed with Erasmus that before grace man has freedom to
choose. The power to implement the choice is available ordy
after grace, but the works are works of faith, not works of
meritorious cooperation. On this latter point he agreed with
Luther against Erasmus. Perhaps, in the final analysis, Melanchthon can be regarded as more Pauline than Colet, Luther, or
Erasmus.
I t is strikingly evident that Erasmus did not regard the primary
sources of wisdom as natural reason, the classical moralists, and
the autonomous exercise of the will in the direction of ethical
goodness-despite Rice's insistence to the contrary. Nor did
Erasmus promise immortality to the follower of Ciceronian
ethics. In fact, revelation and grace are very basic to the
Erasmian system of thought. If Rice's definition of a humanist
were correct, Erasmus would not qualify.

3. Montaigne
Montaigne as a Humanist
Philip P. Hallie furnishes us with a definition of a humanist
which "fits Montaigne like a glove" but which, when applied to
the other personalities discussed in this essay and my previous
one, fits only where it touches.S6 The humanists were those
scholars concerned with grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and
moral philosophy. The only "philosophy" of the humanists was

" Clyde Leonard Manschreck, Melanchthon

the Quiet Reformer (New York,

1958), pp. xiii, 60-63.

Philip P. Hallie, T h e Scar of Montaigne: an Essay in Personal Philosophy
(Middletown, 1966), pp. 9- 10.
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moral philosophy. Their special interest did not include logic,
the natural sciences, metaphysics, mathematics, astronomy,
medicine, law, and theology. "A humanist is somebody more
interested (via his interest in antiquity) in ways of using language
and of living than he is in knowledge of the conclusions of such
fields as physics, mathematics, or theology."s7 The humanists
rejected the Scholastic quest for God. "They were not interested
in what was external to man, nor were they interested in the
externals of men."88 They sought to understand "the ways men
encounter various subjects, the ways they engage in their various
occupations, the ways they live in their various stations."8g
Hallie offers Erasmus, along with Montaigne, as a prime example of his definition. He spares us Rice's emphasis on autonomous reason as the humanist means of achieving wisdom,
presumably because this would not fit Montaigne. But his
definition does not fit Cusa, Colet, or Erasmus. As we have seen,
these three did not make any radical separation of the realm
of faith from the realm of reason and will. There was a distinct
theocentric element in the thought of Cusa, Colet, and Erasmus.
"Philosophia Christi" does not fit comfortably into Hallie's
definition.
On the other hand, the idea presented by Rice, that the
humanists exalted man in relation to the cosmos, extolling the
independent potential of his intellectual and voluntarist powers,
does not apply to Montaigne. He deemphasized man's ascendancy
in the universe, taking the Skeptic view that he is not the ruler
over the rest of creation but is on "the same footing" as the
animals.s0 As an orthodox Skeptic following the lead of Sextus
Empiricus, Montaigne valued life according to nature.D1 By
"nature" he did not mean the laws of nature discovered by
Ibid., p. 10.
=Ibid., 15.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 31.
Ibid., pp. 32, 49.
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human reason alone. He meant "the passions . . . whereby hunger
drives us to food and thirst to drink."92 In other words, "nature"
has reference to the drives which are characteristically experienced by both men and animals.

,

Moreover, what sort of faculty of ours do we not recognize
in the actions of the animals? Is there a society regulated with
more order, diversified into more charges and functions, and
more consistently maintained, than that of the honeybees? Can
we imagine so orderly an arrangement of actions and occupations
as this to be conducted without reason and fore~ight?"~

This is a salient motif in the "Apology of Raymond Sebond."
If Colet demoted human reason by subordinating it to grace,
Montaigne devalued it by asserting its inability to arrive at any
certain truth whether in the philosophical or the natural realm.
Rice's contention that for the humanist "the insights of wisdom
are natural products of the human reason,"s4 excludes Montaigne
from the humanist fraternity. On the other hand, the definition of
a humanist provided in this essay-as one who acknowledges some
place for human intellect and reason in the study of human
behavior and its causes-allows for the inclusion of Montaigne.
Obviously, his reason was not dormant in the recognition of the
endless variety of beliefs, customs, and standards in the world and
the acceptance of the provinciality of his own mores. His point
was that "we have no other test of truth and reason than the
example and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country
we live in."95Reason does have some place in his system, but not
for the discovery of unequivocal truths, not as the source of
wisdom.
Montaigne's Skepticisrn

a

Skepticism was
large ingredient in Montaigne's personal
philosophy. He maintained that Skepticism rescues the mind

" Ibid., p.

32.
Donald M. Frame, trans., T h e Complete Essays of Montaigne (Stanford,
Cal., 1958), p. 332.
=Rice, "John Colet and the Annihilation of the Natural," p. 146.
95 Hallie, p. 19.
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from the sea of doubt and anxiety associated with the search for
philosophical c e r t i t ~ d e As
. ~ ~a Skeptic he rejected metaphysical
laws as well as any concept of natural law underlying the positive
laws of a nation.97The laws, customs and beliefs of any society
he regarded as local and relative.98His motive for accepting the
mores of his own society was expediential, not metaphysical or
His concern was his own "health," which he defined
as the psychological peace resulting from orientation to the
accepted order of society, with minimal concern for any specialized knowledge of man and the cosmos.100But "health" was more
than that. It involved toleration of other people's ideas and ways
of doing things. "In fact, for him, health and the recognition of
variety in the world are much the same thing."lol This life in
accordance with health is life in conformity to the "Practical
Criterion."lo2 Montaigne is categorized as a moderate Catholic
and a "Politique" because his acceptance of the Practical
Criterion rendered him tolerant of any religious or political
world-view.lo3 In this regard his philosophy was to "live and
let live."
As a Skeptic, Montaigne rejected "Indicative Signs," defined
as dialectical proofs of the Absolute, but also as hidden "substances" or "laws" or "essences."104 "Recollective Signs," which
refer to experience that relates to other parts of experience, he
accepted as valid. He held that "no one claim about facts beyond
experience is in the end more certain (or uncertain) than any
other."lo5 Indicative Signs (antitheses) could be very numerous.

" Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., p. 19.
"I Ibid, p. 24.
loo
Ibid., p. 19.
lol Ibid., p. 20.
lOa Ibid., p. 24.
*03 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
lM
Ibid, p. 26.
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Montaigne tolerated them all, but he dignified none of them
as truth.1°6
Montaigne's philosophy implies the relativity of all scientific
knowledge. He spoke of the very real possibility of Copernicus
being replaced by some other astronomer who would upset his
theories. Since there are no eternal guarantees of truth, fashions
of thought will come and go.lo7"In short, the truth of our impressions is relative to ourselves; there may be as many different
kinds of truths as there are different kinds of animals. As for
the independent, essential nature of objects 'behind' those impressions these conflicting impressions and effects lead us to suspend
judgment."108
Acceptance of religious, political and cultural custom was not
a contradiction of Montaigne's subjective philosophy, but was
rather a part of it. He did not put religion into one compartment of
his existence and the Skeptic's life according to nature into another
compartment. Religious conformity and tolerance for the sake
of peace and "health was adjustment to the real situation of life.
It was not based on the conviction of the truth of religious
propositions but on the practical expedient of "hunting with the
pack." It was dictated by the Practical Criterion.
Since, as a Skeptic, Montaigne identified no universal truths
which are valid for all men, his humanism was not likely to become the kind of educative program envisioned by Erasmus and
Melanchthon. His philosophy amounts to this: Do your own thing
within the context of the demands of your own society.

. . . Montaigne ususally spoke not in terms of "us" but in
terms of me, this particular man, with this particular name-a
particular man whose particular yearnings and insights and
impulses overflowed the categories or methods of any school?09
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., pp. 45-46.
lmIbid., p. 31.
loo
Ibid., p. 33.
lW

lW
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The Apology of Raymond Sebond
The essay, the "Apology of Raymond Sebond," effectively illustrates Montaigne's understanding of the intellect-will problem.
The essay was written between 1575 and 1580 as a defence of
Sebond's natural theology. It is a Skeptical essay written to defend
an orthodox Catholic theologian.l1° Montaigne attempts to disarm
both Sebond and his opponents so as to demonstrate the weakness of human reason.
One objection to Sebond's dialectical arguments, which Montaigne regards as somewhat mild, is that matters of faith are
separate from matters of reason and, therefore, Sebond's dialectical enterprise was fruitless.lll Montaigne has two answers. First,
although reason provides no ontological proof, it has considerable psychological value for the believer. I t proves nothing, but
bolsters the attitude of faith.l12 Second, faith cannot be separated
from things human. It is always conditioned by the subject who
adheres to it. Grace is never undefiled by the human recipient.l13
Otherwise, everyone would believe the same way and there would
be no variety. At first sight, this seems inconsistent with Montaigne's ultimate appeal to revelation and grace.
For to make the handful bigger than the hand, the armful
bigger than the arm, and to hope to straddle more than the reach
of our legs, is impossible and unnatural. Nor can man raise himself above himself and humanity; for he can see only with his own
eyes, and seize only with his own grasp. He will rise, if God by
exception lends him a hand; he will rise by abandoning and
renouncing his own means, and letting himself be raised and
uplifted by purely celestial means. It is for our Christian faith,
not for his Stoical virtue, to aspire to that divine and miraculous
metamorph~sis?~~

What is the use of revelation and grace if there is no universally
valid perception of it? Why does Montaigne talk about the divine
Ibid., p. 38.
Ibid., p. 40.
lUIbid., p. 41.
US Ibid.
Frame, p. 457.
UL
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at all if the apprehension of it is so individualized and fragmented?
He speaks elsewhere of the Fideist's simple faith in God as one of
the sources of stability and peace. But in Montaigne's view this is
a highly subjective experience which is culturally, psychologically,
and biologically determined. Revelation in any ultimate sense is
rejected. Because it is received by a particular subject, it is
distorted by subjective experience. Therefore revelation, like
reason, is unable to result in any certain and unvarying truth.
"He will not try to distinguish the ray of divinity from the
human being who 'lodges' it in his mind; he will simply look
at the whole man."l15 Since each and every individual experience
is valid, we should be tolerant to all. This is different from
Nicholas of Cusa's universalism because it is based on a slightly
different premise. Nicholas says that there is some of the same
ultimate truth in all men. Therefore a universal religion should
be possible. Montaigne says that the divine ray is diffused differently in each man. Therefore religious unity is unrealistic.
Tolerance is the watch-word.
Montaigne prized complete, untrammeled freedom of the will.
His thought on this question was in no way determined by
metaphysical or theological considerations. Freedom, however,
was not of the antinomian variety. It involved easy-going conformity to customary law and the pressures of habit and tradition.l16Although his public life made demands upon him contrary
to the dictates of his free will and conscience, he attempted to
fulfill his obligations to society while maintaining an unswerving
loyalty to his unique authentic selfhood.l17
4. Summary and Conclusion

The new approach to matters divine led the Northern humanists
discussed in this and my previous essay to new conclusions
Hallie, p. 43.
IleIbid., p. 118.
U71bid., p. 121.
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about man and his ethical capacities and responsibilities. Nicholas
of Cusa asserted that natural reason cannot find out God.
Intellect is "detained in ignorance" apart from grace, and will is
impotent apart from ,Christ. But both intellect and will are
activated and empowered by a mystical union with the Divine.
This was no radical separation of faith and reason but a redefinition of the relationship between faith-grace and intellect-will.
That Cusa respected the use of natural reason in the natural realm
is demonstrated by his interest in mathematics, astronomy, and
history.
John Colet made a distinction between intellect, which after
reception of grace apprehends God, and that reasonable capacity
by which man studies the phenomenal world. It is will in the
realm of the spiritual, not will in the amoral affairs of daily life,
which to Colet is in bondage apart from grace. As a voluntarist
he saw regenerated will as effective in the area of morals and
ethics. His system is, therefore, somewhat similar to that of Cusa.
Erasmus gave a larger place to human intellect and will than did
Colet and Cusa, but sought to draw reason into the area of faith
by making it, along with revelation, a means to the ethically good
life. Montaigne repudiated both reason and revelation as sources
of unvarying truth in either the spiritual or the natural realms.
Reason has psychological and homiletical value, and human will is
entirely free.
Therefore none of the four writers studied fits into Rice's
definition of a humanist as one who sought by means of autonomous human intellect and will the natural human virtue which
Cicero valued so highly. The tentative, alternative definition
suggested here is that a Renaissance humanist was one who
acknowledged some place for human intellect and reason in the
study of human behavior and its causes, and sometimes also in
the critical study of Christian sources (Scripture, the Fathers,
philosophy), but not in the dialectical investigation of first causes
and the nature of absolute truth.

